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█ Abstract  This study presents a phenomenological analysis of a case of schizotypal personality disorder used 
as a concrete starting point to formulate a basic phenomenological theory of embodied and disembodied de-
sire. After describing the core symptoms of the patient (i.e. mainly his spatial disorder) from a first-person per-
spective, the problem of disembodied desire is introduced in relation to patient’s imaginary that is lived as an 
isolated experience condemned to remaining unrealized. The case analysis refers to Blankenburg’s concept of 
the loss of natural self-experience and to its contemporary development, i.e., the psychopathology of common 
sense, conceiving schizophrenia, and schizotypal personality disorder, as a syndrome rooted in ipseity disturb-
ance and in disembodiment of the self. Disembodied desire is then qualified as a disorder due not to neurotic 
defense mechanisms, but rather to more pervasive self-disorders. In the final part, the problem of disembodied 
desire is addressed starting from a basic phenomenological theory of desire, dealing both with drive intentional-
ity, as the transcendental condition of the ego-constitution, and with imagination, as the distanced self-
representation of drive and as a structural possibility of distancing the immediacy of bodily experience.   
KEYWORDS: Phenomenological Psychopathology; Schizotypal Personality Disorder; Disembodied Desire; Loss 
of Natural Self-evidence; Self-affection. 
 
█ Riassunto La psicopatologia fenomenologica: dal disturbo dell’esperienza spaziale al problema del desiderio disin-
carnato – Questo studio presenta un’analisi fenomenologica di un caso di disturbo schizotipico di personalità, 
sulla cui base si avanza una teoria fenomenologica essenziale sul desiderio incarnato e disincarnato. Alla descri-
zione dei sintomi fondamentali del paziente (in primis il disturbo dell’esperienza spaziale) da una prospettiva in 
prima persona segue la trattazione del desiderio disincarnato in relazione all’immaginario del paziente, vissuto 
come esperienza isolata, condannata a rimanere irrealizzata. L’analisi del caso fa uso della nozione di Blanken-
burg di perdita dell’evidenza naturale e della sua ripresa contemporanea nella psicopatologia del senso comune, 
che considera schizofrenia e disturbo schizotipico di personalità come sindromi radicate nel disturbo 
dell’ipseità e nel cosiddetto sé “disincarnato”. Il desiderio disincarnato è quindi presentato non come disturbo 
dovuto a meccanismi difensivi di tipo nevrotico, ma a disturbi del sé più pervasivi. Nella parte conclusiva, il de-
siderio disincarnato è esaminato a partire da una teoria fenomenologica essenziale del desiderio, che tratta 
l’intenzionalità pulsionale come condizione trascendentale della costituzione dell’io, e l’immaginazione come 
rappresentazione distanziante della pulsione e come possibilità strutturale di distanziarsi dall’immediatezza 
dell’esperienza corporea. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Psicopatologia fenomenologica; Disturbo schizotipico di personalità; Desiderio Disincarnato; 
Perdita dell’evidenza naturale; Affezione.
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█ Introduction 
 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IS 
A TRADITIONAL area of research on mental 
illness based on a descriptive, clinical and 
structural analysis of the patient’s first-person 
experience.1 This paper aims to show how an 
individual, clinical case can be analysed in 
terms of its philosophical implications, starting 
from a phenomenological understanding of its 
psychopathological aspects and developing the-
se into a wider philosophical discussion.  
There are two guiding ideas in this re-
search. The first is theoretical and recom-
mends that since desire is an essential faculty 
of the human being, its psychopathological as-
pects should also be investigated phenomeno-
logically. The second is practical and recom-
mends that philosophical counselling should be 
practiced as a method for engaging patients in 
dialogue, under the supervision of their psy-
chiatrist, and in interdisciplinary collaboration 
with medical, social and educational staff. 
These two ideas lead to two innovative 
proposals: The first proposal is a mutual ex-
change between philosophy and psycho-
pathology, in which philosophy provides the 
tools for a critical analysis of the foundations 
of psychopathology, while also benefitting 
from relevant descriptions of psychopatholog-
ical experience and individual case analyses. 
Phenomenological psychopathology is assu-
med to be the most amenable discipline in the 
field, since it enjoys a well-established tradi-
tion of interdisciplinary research.2  
The psychopathology of mental disorders 
already includes phenomenological criteria 
such as the patients’ first-person perspectives 
or the structural analysis of lived pathological 
experiences. Further, philosophy in general 
and phenomenology in particular are consid-
ered as essential methodological tools and a 
substantial source of reflection for medical re-
search.3 Nevertheless, it is very rare, even in 
phenomenological psychopathology, that an 
individual case offers the concrete chance to 
coin and discuss philosophically relevant con-
cepts: paradigmatic in this sense is Blanken-
burg’s concept of “natural self-evidence”, 
which has both psychopathological and philo-
sophical relevance.4 Something similar, is pro-
posed in this paper with respect to embodied 
and disembodied desire, although this is a less 
extensive study and requires further interdis-
ciplinary research. 
The second innovative proposal is that 
philosophy can be seen not only as a theoreti-
cal tool, but also as a practical one: the philo-
sophical approach in psychiatry does not 
claim to have therapeutic finality. On the con-
trary, it has to be understood as a suspending 
activity, as an interruption of the therapeutic 
logic that necessarily prevails in psychiatry as 
a medical science. It can be offered to patients 
as well as to health workers.5  
Applied to patients, philosophical practice 
must be perceived from the very start not as a 
medical prescription, but as a new possibility 
for patients to reflect not only on their own 
experience, but, more widely and as inde-
pendently from their pathologies as possible, 
on the sense of existing in the world.6 “As in-
dependently from their pathologies as possi-
ble” means that philosophical practice doesn’t 
consist in patients becoming aware of their 
mental illness nor in learning to describe 
themselves in diagnostic or in psychopatho-
logical terms, but in becoming aware through 
dialogue of the problematic sense of human 
experiencing in general and not only of their 
own individual experience.  
Philosophical practice is not a therapy, and 
should not be considered as such, for three 
reasons: (1) because it does not consider the 
patient primarily as a patient but as a dialogic 
agent, as a thinker, suspending judgement on 
his mental illness; (2) because it does not put 
the patient in a passive position as the benefi-
ciary of a medical service, but in an active role 
as the thinker, i.e., the proposer of a sense that 
has to be discussed and valued together in a 
community of people; (3) because it does not 
aim at eliminating pain and suffering, but ra-
ther at a wider understanding and integration 
of pain and suffering in the whole meaning of 
human life. Nevertheless, for the same rea-
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sons, philosophical practice can be considered 
as a rehabilitation activity; indeed, it helps 
improve linguistic abilities by giving new 
words, new categories and new ways to under-
stand and express the world we live in and 
stimulates listening to others’ arguments with 
less fear of critical views.7  
Assuming then philosophical practice as a 
meaningful method to rehabilitate psychiatric 
patients, I will analyse an individual case of 
schizotypal personality disorder which I fol-
lowed for more than six years both in a group 
and individual setting. 
 
█ Case report 
 
Arthur is the fictitious name of the young 
man whose mental disorder I aim to analyse. 
Arthur was born in 1984 and has been assisted 
by the Public Medical Service since the year 
2002. As the patient reports, he began to man-
ifest tics and similar disorders as a child (8-9 
years old), but the symptomatology increased 
at the age of 14, when, after having started 
studies at the gymnasium, he began to develop 
poor concentration, a tendency to get lost in 
thought and in his hypercomplex and inef-
fective studying methods, and finally dropped 
out of school.  
Increasingly secluded, he lost all his friends 
and was exposed to anxiety and phobic epi-
sodes while developing a spatially structured 
disorder, which will be presented below. 
This disorder is associated with tics, with 
an obsessive-compulsive need for order and 
symmetry, even when obtained only with 
great difficulty, with perfectionism and with 
the tendency to avoid human relations for fear 
of contact and intimacy. In Arthur’s critical 
periods he shows uneasiness, frustration and 
rage by crying, shouting and breaking objects 
at home. However, he is always very consider-
ate and helpful with all the other patients he 
has met through the psychiatric service.  
He has an inhibited aggressive stance      
towards people who represent or act in any 
position of power or authority, but he shows 
great sensitivity towards any manifestation of 
human weakness or fragility. In individual  
conversations, after having developed a trust-
ful relationship, he reports having been aware 
of his homosexuality from the age of fourteen, 
even though he does not feel enough self-
assurance to search for a partner.  
Arthur’s case history at the Mental Health 
Centre began in 2002. He had already started 
psychotherapy, but without any remarkable 
results. He had also undergone private psychi-
atric examinations, but had never been treated 
with pharmacological therapy. When the 
symptomatology increased to reach a strong 
«fragmentation anxiety», as reported in the 
case history, «lacking the awareness of illness» 
and leading to consequent «refusal of any 
pharmacological treatment», Arthur was sub-
mitted to involuntary psychiatric treatment in 
March 2004 and again in February and April 
2005, despite his strong personal resistance.  
His last involuntary psychiatric treatment 
at the end of September 2005 quickly resulted 
in admission at a rehabilitation centre, where 
he stayed until the end of September 2007. 
The diagnosis of those years reported in his 
case history is “schizophrenic disorder” (DSM 
IV TR 295.90, ICD 10 F.20.3), which is ques-
tionable and inaccurate, as stated by Arthur’s 
psychiatrists.  
When he returned home he experienced a 
prolonged failure in many projects he tried to 
realize: a remedial course to continue his in-
terrupted studies, learning foreign languages, 
sewing and tailoring clothes, living alone. 
Even when he was able to successfully com-
plete a task, such as passing the driving test or 
working in a public library in a supported em-
ployment programme, this did not appease his 
sense of frustration. Even today he is often 
busy planning renovations and improvements 
to his parent’s home, and he describes it as 
«an obsession that I have had since I was 
fourteen years old».  
After different analyses and discussions   
between the psychiatrists involved in the case 
and myself, the hypothesized correct diagnosis 
is schizotypal personality disorder (DSM IV 
TR 301.22; ICD 10 F21). From a phenomeno-
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logical point of view, the diagnosis is merely 
an orientation category for the clinical prac-
tice, which has to be taken into account and 
subsequently suspended in order to under-
stand the experiences of the person. 
 
█  Spatial disorder in first person perspective 
 
As the description of the patient’s first-
person-perspective is the essential starting 
point of any further examination in phenome-
nological psychopathology,8 the core symptom 
of Arthur’s disorder has to be presented in his 
words. At first glance, Arthur’s spatial experi-
ence is not a predominant topic in his self-
report; on the contrary, it rather seems to be an 
aspect the patient does not like to speak about. 
He describes his difficulties in life in terms of 
«sorrow», «suffering», his own «inner disor-
der» and «the flimsiness of every experience», 
and also in terms of «relational difficulties»: 
 
The main symptom of my unease is a di-
mension of boredom, a dull, smoky dimen-
sion, accompanied by respiratory difficul-
ty, with increased tics and intensified diffi-
culties with relationships. This dull mani-
festation of suffering damages my ability 
to provide a fascinating representation of 
my sorrow at a communicative level.  
 
He is indeed deeply fascinated by his own 
suffering and his own «desperation», some-
how positively valued by him:  
 
Since desperation has been often an ecstat-
ic experience, the idea of suffering has 
somehow taken on a positive association, 
even though it fades in time and can nei-
ther last nor bear a trace of that experien-
tial conjunction in time. In this transitori-
ness, desperation embodies romantically 
the idea of pleasure and sorrow as indis-
tinct or confused dimensions.  
 
He doesn’t speak spontaneously about his 
spatial experience, but only when asked. And 
even when asked, he prefers to write down his 
experience instead of telling me about it di-
rectly. The following quotations are indeed 
translated from his own text, dated January 
2012. He is nevertheless very detailed and pre-
cise in clarifying his odd experience: mainly at 
home, he feels what he calls some kind of 
«threatening dimensions» in the surrounding 
space (the name «dimensioni» was used by his 
former psychotherapist and since then he has 
adopted it, but the word «attentanti»9 is his 
own term) that he must avoid contact with in 
order not to be trapped and affected by them, 
«as the dimension would be a spider web cap-
turing me, permeating me and finally charac-
terizing me».  
The extremities of his body, i.e., his head, 
hands and feet, are particularly sensitive parts 
that should be kept away from these dimen-
sions. However, this vulnerability assumes 
two different aspects: the upper part of his 
head as well as the extremities of his right 
hand and of his right foot, i.e., his right little 
finger and his right little toe, pertain to the 
sphere of «performance and virtue», that is, 
the ability to perform good actions or «to 
reach the top possible performance».  
The lower part of his head as well as the 
extremity of his left hand, i.e., his left little fin-
ger, pertain to the sphere of «concentration 
and intimacy», of «what is mine, specific to 
me even if not talented». The «dimensions» 
can be imagined by dividing space into 
«three-dimensional, mainly cubic, but gelati-
nous forms that can have different sizes and 
can also be irregular». They originate from 
corners of the furniture or of partition walls:  
 
The corner, a sort of catalyser to set a di-
mension, is likely to be the fulcrum of the 
dimension, the point where its nature is 
most intense and powerful, and in some 
way it generates energetically the three-
dimensionality developing around it. The 
dimension has the identity of a person who 
presents herself as competitive and who 
represents a threat to my integrity. The 
competitive dimensions saturate every 
domestic space, it becomes anguishing and 
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problematic because it enters my nest, my 
lair, my shelter to make my life difficult, to 
block me from breathing again. 10  
 
The person referred to is never a relative, 
but usually a health worker whom Arthur met 
during his clinical treatments or a person who 
embodies some special ability or quality he 
would like to have (for instance, famous       
designers or stylists). When he perceives the 
presence of a threatening dimension, he has to 
avoid touching it with his sensitive body parts 
or with sensitive objects (food, gloves and hair 
gel). These objects are sensitive due to «their 
deepest contact with my inner body or their 
closeness to my sensitive bodily parts».  
So when moving he must constantly pay 
attention to the position of the dimensions, 
as he fears that otherwise his ideas might be 
stolen (e.g., some clothing design he has in 
mind might be copied by an admired stylist), 
that his thoughts could be seen and damaged 
(e.g., by the health workers he dislikes) or 
that his ability could be taken away from him 
(e.g., the ability to express himself in contact 
with others could be “stolen”, for instance, by 
a former schoolmate, whom he experienced 
as better able to communicate with others).  
 
Three-dimensionality is not fixed but ela-
stic: it is the emotions that provoke the ex-
pansion or the reduction, i.e., the change of 
a dimension. But it is not an expansion, a 
physical movement in space, it is more its 
influence which is growing or weakening 
according to my mood or the psychological 
condition moving me at that moment. One 
could speak more of a variation in the range 
of influence of the dimension than of its 
physical expansion. That’s why I spoke of 
“energy generation”: because the three-
dimensionality is given by a sort of per-
ceived radiation that gives me a sense of   
epidermal physicality. Or maybe one could 
speak more of a transformation of my 
movement through spaces than of a varia-
tion of the range of influence: sometimes it 
is almost a dance, it is fluid and relaxed, and 
sometimes, on the contrary, it becomes 
spasmodic, writhing, violent, jerking, rigid 
and loses elasticity. 
 
Arthur is perfectly conscious of being “the 
author” of the dimensions: he experiences a 
form of compulsion in «positioning a dimen-
sion» and he fears the thoughts of the     
«menacing» person or of the «dimensions» 
themselves, because he fears he will be com-
pelled to «position» one of them in the space 
he presently finds himself in.  
He defines this positioning of dimensions as 
a form of «propitiatory rite» that normally 
performs a ritual function in containing his 
own anxiety, even though sometimes it also 
conspicuously increases it. He is also clearly 
aware that this will seem odd to others: he per-
forms his rituals mostly at night, when nobody 
can watch him.  
When asked if he has ever explained his ri-
tuals to his mother as analytically as he did to 
me, he answered «No, she would get scared». 
When trying to find a meaning in his suffer-
ing, he is somehow capable of effectively de-
scribing his existential condition, although he 
mostly complains about not being able to ex-
plain what he feels:  
 
In the world I see a dynamic reality, a crea-
tive dynamism. But I live at home in a vain 
vortex of imagination, my night life is 
spent in idealizing and coexisting with my 
own potential. It has always been a phan-
tom, a personal and flimsy projection to 
give me the measure of my presence in the 
world, I’ve always seen myself condemned 
to visualize a perspective destined to never 
be realized, to give me neither confirma-
tion nor frustration of my expectations. 
The idea of my being in the world is fun-
damentally bound to an extremely heavy 
and extremely painful phantom, illusory, 
both in a positive and in a negative sense. 
 
He experiences a substantial difference    
between his inner condition and the external 
world. Outside there is “reality”, that is, the 
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dynamics of potentiality, action and realiza-
tion. Inside there is “ideality”, or “idealization” 
(he uses the word «ideal» very often), that is, 
his imaginary lived not as potentiality, but as 
isolated experience condemned to never be  
realized. His imagination tends to be detached 
from reality, more similar to an illusion than 
to a real possibility: as we are going to suggest 
in the analysis below, this problem can mean-
ingfully be called “disembodied desire”. 
 
█  Phenomenological analysis: From loss of 
natural self-evidence to disembodied desire 
 
Phenomenological psychopathology is 
both an empirical and an eidetic science, in 
Blankenburg’s Husserlian perspective.11 It 
means that the empirical manifestation of an 
individual pathology can be investigated in its 
essence: each pathology shows an inner, char-
acterizing and recurring structure, that is its 
“eidos”, its «morphological core of sense».12 
The aims of this paper are both to analyze 
Arthur’s case from a phenomenological per-
spective and to point to disembodied desire as 
an essential structure of his whole experience, 
supporting this thesis with a basic phenome-
nological theory of embodied desire. To 
achieve these aims, it is necessary to start with 
the parallels between Arthur’s case and Blank-
enburg’s patient Anne: the similarities allow 
me to speak of loss of natural self-evidence in 
Arthur’s case and to underline his problematic 
self- and ego-constitution, that is the structur-
al genesis of the self and the ego, according to 
Blankenburg’s phenomenological theory.  
As schizophrenia has recently been recon-
sidered, in continuity with Blankenburg’s ap-
proach, as a disembodiment of the self, that is 
the lack, or weakening, of sensory-motor self-
consciousness,13 the next step in the phenom-
enological analysis is to present disembodi-
ment and ipseity disorder as core concepts in 
Arthur’s case.  
So phenomenological psychopathology is 
integrated with the enactive approach, con-
ceiving of human beings as living systems 
making sense of their own experience thanks 
to embodied action shared in a social dimen-
sion.14 Disembodied desire is thus character-
ized as a disorder due not to neurotic defence 
mechanisms, but rather to more pervasive self-
disorders such as loss of natural self-evidence, 
disembodiment and ipseity disturbance. 
The phenomenological analysis of Arthur’s 
case is completed by a structural analysis of his 
lived space and lived time in relation to his 
bodily and imaginative experience, consider-
ing both as essential aspects of desiring. In the 
final philosophical elucidation of embodied 
and disembodied desire, bodily consciousness, 
in terms of drive intentionality or self-af-
fection, and imagination are considered as 
transcendental conditions of desiring: a basic 
phenomenology of embodied desire is ulti-
mately essential in understanding the qualita-
tive difference of Arthur’s experience, but also 
the vital relevance of his disembodied desire. 
 
█  Escaping the void: Loss of natural self-
evidence and imagination 
 
Considering that ICD 10, contrary to DSM 
IV TR, includes schizotypal personality disor-
der in the cluster “schizophrenia” and assum-
ing that the diagnosis of schizotypal personali-
ty disorder is correct, I assume that Arthur’s     
disorder can be considered comparable to that 
of Blankenburg’s «symptom-poor schizo-
phrenics».15 By loss of natural self-evidence, 
Blankenburg means a loss of the usual com-
mon-sense orientation to reality, i.e., the loss 
of the unproblematic sense of obviousness and 
unquestioned background that normally ena-
bles a person to act and live in the social and 
practical world.  
Blankenburg’s central example case, his pa-
tient Anne, is increasingly unable to live in the 
intersubjective world because she does not 
know how to perform even the simplest ac-
tions and is assailed by «impossible ques-
tions», i.e., impossible for her to answer, even 
though for healthy people they refer to self-
evident, obvious, taken for granted ways of 
being.16 
Arthur complains about a similar difficulty 
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in self-expression, about being overloaded by 
impressions and sensations that occur even in 
the smallest tasks of his daily life: «In my in-
ner chaos, I cannot focus on what I feel, and 
that’s what takes away my energies to read, to 
study and to learn». Like Anne, he also be-
lieves that his problems are due to the fact 
that he has not been «mentored» enough in 
his learning, even in the most ordinary activi-
ties like housework or hobbies: 
 
It would be useful for me to learn do-it-
yourself as an approach to reality, but it 
never worked with my parents. I cannot 
learn from my father, he destroys all my 
projects and makes a mess. I’m constantly 
nervous when doing even the most banal 
things, because we [my family and I] can-
not figure out how to make me aware of 
what I’m doing.  
 
Even while in an assisted living apartment 
where the educational staff support patients in 
their daily life, he says: «I don’t get any help 
to improve my attention span and to give me a 
grip». Listening to Arthur, the lacking «grip» 
seems to be, on the one hand, his inability «to 
be aware» of what he is doing,17 therefore be-
ing unable to acquire that tacit knowledge 
corresponding to common sense and to natu-
ralness by doing (natürliche Selbstverständ-
lichkeit):  
 
I need to make models of what I learn, oth-
erwise what others tell me comes into my 
head and vanishes immediately. Neverthe-
less, the attempt to organize my knowledge 
creates a sense of dispersion in me. My or-
der is always too complex, so much so that it 
becomes a labyrinth where I get lost. 
 
On the other hand, lacking grip describes 
his relation to others:  
 
I cannot stand the communication gap ex-
isting between me and others, therefore I 
can’t exercise acceptance and acknow-
ledgment if I cannot qualify this gap as dis-
sent or if I cannot express it. Rage arises 
when I feel myself collapsing in a void of 
words: it gives me the feeling I am being 
disqualified by other people. 
 
Since Arthur was a teenager, a transfor-
mation in his intersubjective world has been 
observable, which suggests a transformation in 
his ego-constitution (Ich-Konstitution), that is, 
the structural, transcendental genesis of the 
ego.18 His incapacity «to be aware» of what he 
is doing and to learn from others and the im-
pression he has «of a constant misunderstand-
ing» with others prevent him from any equal 
intersubjective relationship. As Anne said: «It’s 
not necessary to see an exterior effect, but in-
side I really sense how I can’t go down well with 
anybody. Somehow the others unsaddle me 
regularly…».19 Similarly, Arthur says: 
 
The presence of others causes scattering in 
me; I cannot study, I cannot concentrate. 
I’m scared of what is lost in each person 
that may be in front of me. What is lost is 
not a real presence, it is a perceived pre-
sence and it is always imperfect, incom-
plete, partly lost. I look at others and it 
seems to me as if I’m asking myself which 
percentage of life is still present in them. I 
try to stay with others even beyond what I 
perceive, even if the other doesn’t fully in-
tercept me, but my experience with others 
remains virtual. 
 
He constantly feels not only insecure or   in-
adequate, but also unable to sustain the pre-
sence of others, most of all of self-confident 
people whom he perceives as menacing his in-
tegrity. Also for Anne, other people’s natural-
ness was a source of anxiety and provoked 
stronger awareness of her own lack of it.20 Ar-
thur reports: «After many years of failure in 
structuring my identity I can’t stand to see    
other people having what I lack. I survive only 
by negating others’ possible merits, abilities and 
qualities».  
His altruistic bent can then only emerge 
with other patients, in whom he usually reco-
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gnizes a similar weakness and suffering, but 
his relation to them is always afflicted with a 
sense of guilt for being a possible source of 
anxiety to them. He lives in a state of perplexi-
ty, regarding the effect his words could have 
on them and the ideas they might have about 
him. As every relationship with any person is 
very stressful for him, he tends to avoid peo-
ple. The more he remains by himself, howev-
er, the more desperately he longs for intimacy, 
interpersonal contact and reciprocity. 
Arthur’s ego-constitution is thus proble-
matic on the double level distinguished by 
Blankenburg: on the one hand, at the level of 
one’s own self constitution («die Konstitution 
eines Selbst»)21 and on the other hand, at the 
level of intersubjectivity, which is itself both 
constituted by and constitutive for the ego.22 
On the first level, Blankenburg differentiates 
between the natural, empirical self, the experi-
encing one, and the transcendental self, the 
one structuring experience: a structural, pre-
reflexive disruption in the transcendental self, 
such as Blankenburg supposes in symptom-
poor-schizophrenics, implies that each action 
loses its taken-for-granted justification and 
that void comes to pervade the ego in the 
form of disappointment and failure.23 On the 
second level, a healthy, intersubjective en-
counter occurs in a fine oscillatory and recip-
rocal relatedness between the two poles of 
self-assertion and self-donation, of taking and 
being-taken. But Anne’s experience of being a 
structurally weakened self, entailed a rigid al-
ternative between being subjected to others or 
judging them and quickly turning judgment in-
to contempt. The same is true for Arthur. The 
level of equal reciprocity is never attained.24 
As is known, Anne committed suicide.    
Arthur has fortunately developed a better 
strategy to compensate for his weak ego-
constitution, a strategy that was not at Anne’s 
disposal: to live in an imaginary intersubjec-
tive world. Indeed, Arthur describes many im-
aginary states as detached from his ordinary 
activities and from his ordinary competences: 
in particular, while listening to music, he has a 
lot of ideas, for instance about possible cho-
reographies, even though he has never learned 
to dance, or about clothes he could design, 
even though he has only taken a few sewing 
lessons, or about objects he might design, even 
though he has no knowledge of how to ac-
complish this.  
He seems to build up a world in which he 
can realize what he is not actually able to do 
and doubts he will ever actually be able to re-
alize. Moreover, he does not only live in an at-
mosphere of reverie, but also theorizes about 
the value of his imaginary experience, idealiz-
ing it as a «fantastic refuge», a personal «se-
cret». He asserts: 
 
The possibility of inwardly taking care of a 
fantasy is the very same salvation of pos-
sessing an interior ideal that can’t be belit-
tled in reality, precisely because it is lived 
in solitude, in a space without light, or bet-
ter, without that light that belittles things 
while revealing their form, disclosing their 
mystery, crumbling them in their own de-
finition. 
 
What he means is that ideality – to the ex-
tent that it is made up of fantasy detached 
from reality – will never undergo a crumbling 
process, if it is not shared with anybody (i.e., 
not exposed to criticism) nor realized (i.e., ex-
posed neither to modification nor to failure). 
Taking care of his private, secret fantasies is 
for him the only way to take care of himself, of 
his own «mystery»: if for the clinical eye, this 
is the recognizable mystery of his pathology, 
for the phenomenological eye, it is the mys-
tery, or incomprehensibility,25 of his own mo-
de of existence.  
In a clinical perspective, then, the rich ima-
gination manifested by Arthur can be read as 
a hypertrophic compensation of the structural 
void left by the failed ego-constitution: the   
departure from reality observed in his imagi-
nation and thinking processes is an active cop-
ing strategy made up of reverie and idealiza-
tion which opposes the loss of common-sense 
and of natural experiencing due to the core 
disturbance of his schizotypy.  
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Arthur is aware of the positive value of his 
imagination, but he lives it antagonistically:   
intimacy and ideality, obscurity and possibil-
ity, are indeed depicted in strong contrast with 
definition and reality, light and actuality, 
where the first pole, against our intuitive value 
attribution, assumes the positive value of a not 
yet unveiled, mysterious beauty, and the se-
cond a negative one of banal mediocrity. Such 
evaluations reveal an attitude that Stanghel-
lini, in his psychopathology of common sense 
applied to schizophrenia, defines as “antago-
nomia”, i.e., as «an active positioning of one-
self on the other side of the fence from com-
mon sense, with a tendency to bracket com-
mon sense values and beliefs» not out of free 
choice, but out of necessity, as it were a desti-
ny.26 Arthur indeed claims to be «condemned 
to visualize a perspective destined to no realiza-
tion»: his coping strategy has the by-product 
of enlarging the void while escaping from it. 
 
█  Disembodiment and ipseity disturbance  
 
The latest studies on schizophrenia have 
developed Blankenburg’s approach towards a 
unitary understanding of schizophrenia as dis-
embodiment of the self, that is, a weakening of 
pre-reflexive, sensory-motor self-awareness.27  
Like Stanghellini, both Sass, Parnas and 
Fuchs as well as Fuchs and Schlimme refer  
explicitly to Blankenburg in their refunding of 
phenomenological psychopathology of schi-
zophrenia. Despite some differences in their    
approaches, they all consider self-disorders as 
the «clinical core» of schizophrenia.28 Self-
disorders are anomalies of experience occur-
ring «both in schizophrenia and in schizoty-
pal disorder».29 They include a lack of the 
sense of mineness, normally associated with 
every embodied self-awareness, i.e., the im-
mediate, tacit awareness of being the me who 
is perceiving, sensing, moving and thinking.  
The sense of mineness is taken to be the 
core dimension of so-called ipseity (ipse being 
the Latin term for “self” or “itself”): ipseity is a 
fundamental sense of being alive as the same 
subject of experience in time and space, per-
meating every perception, cognition, emotion 
or action immediately lived as “mine”.30 Fur-
thermore, the sense of mineness is a pre-
reflexive relation to oneself, which represents 
the condition of possibility for every bodily 
and reflective self-relation. It is a fundamental, 
constitutive element of common sense, the es-
sential background know-how of embodied 
action and cognition.31 
Sass and Parnas have argued that schizo-
phrenia is fundamentally a self-disorder, or   
ipseity disturbance, characterized by two com-
plementary distortions of self-awareness: hy-
perreflexivity and diminished self-affection.32  
Hyperreflexivity refers to forms of exag-
gerated self-consciousness in which some     
aspects of oneself, like ordinary thoughts or 
actions, are experienced in a condition of self-
alienation as akin to external objects (Arthur: 
«Nevertheless, the attempt to organize my 
knowledge creates a sense of dispersion in me. 
My order is always too complex, so much so 
that it becomes a labyrinth where I get lost»). 
Diminished self-affection refers instead to a 
weakened sense of existing as a vital source of 
awareness and action (Arthur: «The main 
symptom of my unease is a dimension of 
boredom, a dull, smoky dimension»).  
These complementary distortions imply a 
transformation in subjectivity, a «change in 
the personality»,33 expressed by a loss of per-
ceptual and conceptual «grip» or «hold» on 
reality, i.e., a loss «of the sharpness or stability 
with which figures or meanings emerge from 
and against some kind of background con-
text» (Arthur: «I don’t get any help to impro-
ve my attention span and to give me a grip», 
«we don’t know how to make me aware of 
what I’m doing»).34 So the void Arthur expe-
riences is primarily the lack of awareness as 
pre-reflexive anchorage to his own existence 
and to the world. 
Thomas Fuchs, on the other hand, pro-
ceeds by presenting the pre-reflexive anchor-
age to the world as bodily «operative inten-
tionality»35 and by focusing particularly on its 
disruption as loss of transparency in self-
awareness and self-affection in schizophrenic 
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patients.36 According to Fuchs, transparency 
of the embodied consciousness is based on an 
“as-structure”: thanks to my body, I perceive 
an object as the object I am perceiving or act-
ing upon without any cognitive inference. 
Transparency of self-awareness makes our 
conscious life a situated life in body, time, 
space and also in society, as a set of intersub-
jective practices, values and cultures. A loss of 
transparency, or, in Blankenburg’s terms, a 
loss of natural self-evidence, arises as a «path-
ologic explication of the implicit» (Arthur: «I 
need to make models of what I learn») and 
«is the result of the fragmentation of bodily 
intentionality itself».37 
As we have seen, such anomalies of self-
experience are common to Arthur’s experi-
ence and are very difficult to describe. This 
clinical perspective nevertheless helps us un-
derstand not only the core disturbance of Ar-
thur’s schizotypy, but also his first-person ex-
perience of not being able to explain what he 
experiences. Arthur’s peculiarity, compared to 
the usual testimonies collected from similar 
patients,38 is not so much the quality of his ex-
perience, as it is the enduring seduction exert-
ed by his own emotionally intense, imaginary 
world, depicted as a «not reducible, meagre 
and redundant melody of sensation». He de-
scribes his escape from the void in his own 
vanishing world of sensations and imaginings 
as follows: 
 
I go to sleep at night, promising myself to 
get up as strong as a lion, but in the morn-
ing, I notice that my energies live only in 
the moment of expectation, in the ideal of 
a brilliant start. And so, whilst the day        
destroys all my projects, I let myself be 
overwhelmed by such a gratifying laxness, 
one that lets reality’s outlines fade, that    
reduces the unbearable weight of forms. I 
allow myself another hour in bed in the    
afternoon, not to rest but to fly away just a 
little more. I wake up, seeing the light of 
the sunset outside the window, and I want 
to die just to suppress in that moment the 
vicelike grip of another ineffectual day- I 
then fling myself out of the bed by an     
impulsivity preceding the thought, only to 
fall prey […] to that sensational opacity in 
which I come back to desire only the nest 
I’ve just voluntarily rejected. I recall the 
nest while abandoning myself in front of 
the television, in a frenetic zapping where 
no program can reach the inconstancy of 
my thoughts; I stop only when I encounter  
music, the only thing representing in that 
moment a heart with such a redundant 
void that I can mirror in it the wonderful 
emptiness filling up my escape. 
 
The «redundant void», the «wonderful 
emptiness» that Arthur complains about are 
considerably different from the disappoint-
ment of failure which led Anne to her suicide. 
They are aspects of disembodied desire, in-
tended as disordered imaginative experience, 
which give him a chance for identification: it is 
obtained by avoiding reality, avoiding partici-
pating in the world and in relations with others, 
but it represents to him a secondary anchorage 
to life, even better than the primary, at least as 
long as he considers imagination superior to 
reality. Nevertheless, suicide unfortunately re-
mains a possibility in Arthur’s life: after many 
years of disease and failures, his coping strate-
gies, relying on evanescent imagination, are 
progressively and inevitably crumbling. For a 
better understanding of these aspects of his 
condition, further analysis is required. 
 
█  The spatial disorder 
 
From a phenomenological perspective, 
«consciousness is to be inherent in the thing 
through the body»,39 and as embodiment the-
ory, largely influenced by Merleau-Ponty, is 
«on the way to become a major paradigm in 
psychopathology»,40 Arthur’s mode of exist-
ence has to be more thoroughly analysed in its 
bodily and spatial aspects.  
Space, and in particular lived space, become 
a central category of structural phenomenolo-
gical analysis because of its relation to the body, 
in opposition to traditional Husserlian phe-
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nomenology, where the predominance of lived 
time corresponds to a transcendental concep-
tion of consciousness still far from the situat-
edness of body.41 Fuchs defines lived space as 
«the totality of space that a person pre-
reflectively “lives” and experiences, with its sit-
uations, conditions, movements, effects and its 
horizon of possibilities — meaning, the envi-
ronment and sphere of action of a bodily sub-
ject».42  
Considering lived space as an extension of 
pre-reflexive bodily experience, it is necessary 
to describe some relevant aspects of Arthur’s 
lived body in order to understand both his 
lived space and his spatial disorder. Arthur’s 
body has been affected by a nervous head tic 
since he was a little child. This nervous head 
tic never faded way. During the fifth grade (ten 
years old), he remembers receiving an «excess 
of attention» from his schoolmates and his 
teacher on this tic and his consequent shame.  
He also reports a form of breathlessness 
which still affects him today and which he   
traces back to this very same period. He re-
members the first episode of constricted 
breathing happening when he was eleven 
years, in the summer after the death of his ma-
ternal grandmother, when he was trying to 
learn by heart an increasing number of news-
paper articles as well as physiological notions 
«in order to be prepared» for the first year of 
secondary school and «to get a sense of ful-
filment». He remembers that he already un-
derstood that it had to be something similar to 
an anxiety attack.  
Since then, his rituals progressively in-
creased together with his anxiety, until they 
reached a “systematization” in the peculiar 
emotional transfiguration of lived space de-
scribed above that Arthur experienced at the 
age of fourteen. His rituals are nevertheless not 
confined to what he calls «dimensions»: enter-
ing a room, a car, a new space, or even touching 
an object or a surface, can push Arthur to initi-
ate a ritual such as moving in and out of the 
doorway, repeatedly touching the car-door, or 
even walking back and forth tracing the same 
route when walking in an open space. 
As he explains it, touching objects and 
moving back and forth in space are coping 
strategies for him, i.e., rituals performed to 
control his anxiety, which alternate with, or 
are accompanied by, some special gestures 
and positions of his sensitive parts (head, 
hands and feet), which help him in “propitiat-
ing” his lived space and in protecting him from 
any possible external menace. All these rituals 
have the appearance of a bodily hyperreflexivi-
ty, a bodily overreaction to the experience of a 
menacing void, of a fragmented bodily inten-
tionality and its consequential anxiety. As 
Fuchs writes in his “teleology of corporeality”: 
 
Anxiety is a meaningful process not only 
on a physiological level […], but also as a 
bodily event: in a situation where the body 
boundaries are threatened or over-
whelmed, a “centralization” of bodily di-
rections occurs […] leading to an increased 
“presence” and a more intense self-expe-
rience (intensiveres Ich-Erleben), which is a 
defence against dissolving effects. Also 
meaningful vis-à-vis an anxiety-provoking 
situation is the tendency of anxiety toward 
contraction, i.e., to duck oneself, to draw 
up one’s extremities and to remain rigid. It 
is the form of expression (“Ausdrucks-
gestalt”) of defending or hiding oneself […] 
– In a similar way, anger can be interpreted 
as “clearing the way” for a previously re-
pressed body impulse, lust, as an opening of 
the body to communication with the envi-
ronment, both as tendencies to balance the 
tightness within the “body economy”.43 
 
This is essential for understanding the cor-
poreal dynamic lived by Arthur: the two poles 
of anxiety/constriction on the one hand, and 
rage/explosion, instead of natural lust/open-
ing (what seems almost impossible for him), 
on the other hand, dramatically influence his 
bodily and emotional life. As clearly emerges 
from his mother’s account of his behaviour at 
home, he alternatively manifests anxiety (try-
ing to involve his parents in his need for order 
and for respect for the dimensions) and rage 
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(breaking objects and crying out, mainly at his 
father). Between these two violent poles, the 
only possible freedom for him is in his imagi-
nation, even if it has the structure, due to his 
self-disorder, of an imagination detached 
from his actual potential.  
Arthur’s lust does not open his body to 
communication with the environment: his 
body is probably impeded by anxiety in the  
realization of its vital impulses, such that it   
loses its vital contact and its natural, embod-
ied relation to reality.  
As we have seen, Arthur himself describes 
the existential condition connected with his 
suffering as the experience of a division be-
tween the outside world and his home: in the 
world, he sees a «dynamic, creative reality, a 
creative dynamism» that can be interpreted 
as the dynamism of «drive impulse» (Hus-
serl’s Triebimpuls) moving from lack to satis-
faction, from emptiness to fulfilment and so 
on44 and which provides an organic rhythm to 
human life and sustains a healthy, embodied 
relation with the world. When at home, in 
contrast, he sees in himself «a vain vortex of 
imagination, a night life spent in idealizing 
and coexisting with the potential of myself», 
i.e., a disembodied desire, a desire he is able to 
experience in its virtual, imaginative dimen-
sion only.  
Hence his identity is achieved only by cre-
ating a very personal, imaginary, disembodied 
world: it is «a phantom», «a personal and 
flimsy projection» that conveys the extent to 
which he is «present in the world»; it is «an 
extremely heavy and extremely painful – as 
well as illusory – phantom, in a positive as well 
as in a negative sense», that detains his poten-
tial for existence in the world. Disembodied 
desire is hence a desire not open to the world, 
but closed in the inner circuit of fantasy which 
never reaches any satisfaction in the external 
world. Arthur’s lived space is then deprived 
not only by his anomalous self-experience, but 
his void is also emphasized by his active de-
parture from reality, by the “avoiding” attitude 
his disembodied desire enacts.  
Imagination, in playing its compensatory 
role, then comes to fill up his disrupted bodily 
experiences with a bizarre sense: to every    
“energetically generated dimension” (i.e., to 
every bodily perceived disorder or block), a 
precise identity is imaginatively assigned, 
namely the one of a «competitive» person 
who represents a menacing, threatening pres-
ence or, as Arthur says, a person «with patho-
genic influence». The avoided presence of 
others thus comes back to the dimensions 
through imagination: they gain a quasi-
physical space in the form of «energy genera-
tion». Lacking a real embodied experience, he 
lives in a fictitiously personified space.  
This theory coherently develops Bleuler’s 
and Minkowski’s idea of schizophrenic au-
tism. Bleuler defined autism as «the detach-
ment from reality and the predominance of 
inner life», detecting it as a core disturbance 
of schizophrenia, whereas Minkowski extend-
ed the notion of autism interpreting its primary 
activity as «rupture in the intimate connection 
with the becoming-environment», or, in other 
words, as «loss of vital contact with reality», 
intended as the generating disturbance («trou-
ble générateur») of schizophrenia.45  
The concept of disembodied desire em-
phasizes the ambivalent, typically schizoid 
character of hyperaesthesia and affective an-
aesthesia, in the context of a simultaneous, 
contradictory presence of opposite aspects: 
«in understanding schizoidia it can’t be re-
peated too often that the schizoid is neither 
too sensitive nor too cold but rather both at 
the same time».46 Speaking of disembodied 
desire implies then a dynamics in this contra-
dictory simultaneity of hyperaesthesia and af-
fective anaesthesia, where the compensative 
functions of imagination, i.e. its possibility to 
put in an imaginative context the experienced 
excess of sensations and to imaginatively fulfil 
unsatisfied desires, (what Minkowski called 
rich autism) have the by-product of enlarging 
the void (what Minkowski called poor au-
tism). Desire is not only disembodied, but dis-
embodying. In parallel, too much exposure to 
sensations provokes so much anxiety that it  
becomes unbearable and feeds the need for 
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detachment that isolation and imagination 
can provide. Disembodied desire is then “au-
tistic” in the sense of closing in an inner, de-
tached and isolated circuit. 
From a psychological point of view it is very 
interesting to note that the more a person has 
some particular desirable ability or feature, the 
more he or she seems menacing to Arthur. So 
the «dimensions» can be regarded as taboo 
zones – detached and isolated from the context 
– in which the opposing aspects of being attrac-
tive and repulsive coexist simultaneously.47  
Thus, for example, the imaginary presence 
of a French stylist positioned by Arthur at a 
corner of his table has the ability to draw a 
piece of clothing Arthur would have liked to 
draw, or which he himself has imagined. But if 
he gets trapped by that dimension, the stylist 
will steal his ideas, i.e., his ability and thus his 
potential. So when cooking, Arthur’s mother 
also has to avoid the invisible spaces that      
Arthur considers dangerous, otherwise he will 
not eat anything that has come in contact with 
the dimensions. Even if it is not possible to 
provide here a psychodynamic analysis of his 
family relations, it is interesting to remark 
how even a primary need like hunger has to 
pass through a “propitiatory rite” to be enti-
tled to satisfaction.  
Representative of his stance towards his 
own drives, hunger shows his tendency to    
abstinence: he usually eats too little, has di-
gestive troubles because of his anxiety, even 
when living independently from his parents, 
and he is constantly underweight. 
For Arthur even a touch has rarely the 
sense of an immediate, pre-reflexive relation-
ship with the world. Rather, it is another tool 
of his bodily hyperreflexivity: touch is an      
instrument of interaction with both the attrac-
tive-repulsive zone of the dimensions as well 
as objects filling up and delimiting his envi-
ronment. Touch is indeed an orienting sense 
essential for finding our place among others.48 
Arthur describes it as follows: 
  
Sometimes I use touch to have the sensa-
tion of a beneficial, positive physicality, as 
if it was “flowing” and “freeing” the surface 
of something (e.g., a table, wardrobe, wall) 
from potential dimensions, which are 
thickening on it. Sometimes touch helps 
me to overcome a dimension: through 
touch, I am better able to hold back the 
dimension or to push it in the opposite di-
rection, away from me (even if the dimen-
sion remains static). Other times, especial-
ly in the case of the “aerial”, “ethereal” di-
mensions that I visualize and perceive, I 
overcome a dimension by dodging it and 
going beyond it, which is generally a rapid, 
meteoric process (when I remain “stuck” 
or “trapped”, I have more difficulties in 
overcoming it, thus touch in this case helps 
me in the form of rubbing the object). 
Touch sometimes gives me feedback in the 
sense of “definition”, or of “tactile con-
creteness”, and thus helps to reify, to con-
cretize the still potentially existing dimen-
sion. But touch doesn’t participate regular-
ly: if the dimension is particularly alive, it is 
as if it were hot, electrifying, so I don’t 
touch it because I would have a sense of 
getting infected more than getting help. 
 
Touch has the properties of a mediating 
instrument: it can help Arthur to create dis-
tance, it can help him to escape, or to define 
and thus to confine the dimensions, but it also 
brings risk of infection, i.e., it is a medium of 
contagion. In any case, touch seems to have 
lost its immediacy, its natural receptivity. I 
suppose it is just the concreteness of his bodily 
experience that lets Arthur maintain a good 
level of self-awareness and of mineness, con-
ferring a compulsive character to the «posi-
tioning of a dimension» rather than the as-
pect of a delusional experience: he is indeed 
well aware of being the author of this position-
ing and doesn’t believe he is compelled by any 
external force or presence. 
Like touch, bodily movements also play an 
active part in creating a dialogue with the    
«dimensions». Moving in the lived space 
helps him to move beyond them or even to 
interact emotionally with their proportions: 
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the dimensions can indeed vary their «sphere 
of influence» in connection with Arthur’s 
emotional states, but his movements can also 
interact with these states and the space that 
imaginatively represents them. If he is in a 
better mood, he moves in his “dimensioned” 
space rapidly and elegantly like a dancer, 
therefore “neutralizing” or at least reducing 
the negative impact of the dimensions; if he is 
scared or in anguish, he flounces and moves 
spasmodically or remains rigid and inelastic, 
thus enlarging its «sphere of influence». 
Arthur’s spatial disorder is then to be un-
derstood as a mode of escaping or controlling 
the anxiety implied by the state of being af-
fected by an undefined, ambivalent, inner, but 
alien need for relationship with the outer 
world. I thus propose to call this disorder af-
fection anxiety. Anxiety, intended as an «af-
fective reaction of the subject to the experi-
ence of being at the mercy of his own life»,49 
seems to permeate Arthur’s self-affection: as 
his vital impulses and drives are interrupted or 
blocked, they are experienced as own and al-
ien at the same time, weakening the stability, 
continuity and coherence of his self- and 
world-experience. Imagination, as far as it 
provides the possibility of a «distanced self-
representation of drive»,50 can restrain such 
anxiety, giving a form to an undefined fear 
(menacing dimensions) and creating defense 
strategies (propitiatory rituals). Unfortunate-
ly, his imaginative life then necessarily falls 
prey to ambivalence, too.  
Hence, in Arthur’s lived space, we find the 
rituals he has created to cope with a very high 
level of affection anxiety, what I underline as 
the central emotional aspect of his self-
disorder. His affection anxiety lets him per-
ceive objects and persons he is interested in as 
both attractive and repulsive. He escapes anx-
iety through a bodily, ritual avoidance of the 
menacing contact with his attractive-repulsive 
environment. He calls it «dance» and claims 
that it can «somehow structure an even per-
sistent fragmentation». His artificial, manner-
ist sequence of movements, from his first-
person perspective, is able to give «sense and 
unity» to his fragmented experience – at least 
momentarily.  
 
█  Paradoxically lived time 
 
Being too affected by his anxiety and his 
menacing ambivalence to remember clearly 
(i.e., univocally) what he is experiencing and 
what he is learning, Arthur finds it difficult to 
structure his experience in a succession of 
past, present and future events. The problem 
is however not on the cognitive, theoretical 
level, where he is perfectly able to distinguish 
the different temporal aspects of his life; what 
is really problematic for him is to have an em-
bodied memory and an embodied imagination, 
i.e., a memory and an imagination guiding his 
practical daily life.  
Arthur’s lived time is indeed the instant, in 
German called “Augenblick”: the instant of an 
eye blink, an instant without past and without 
future. It can seem eternal, but only to imagi-
nation; an instant of consciously illusive eter-
nity. In his imagination, in his imaginatively 
lived time, or, more precisely, in his detached, 
disembodied fantasy, Arthur can even live in 
the instant of supreme desire, the instant of 
which Faust would say «Verweile doch, du bist 
so schön!» (Stay a while, you are so beautiful!), 
the instant in which completeness, fulfilment 
and beauty are touchable, perfectly present, 
perfectly fused with one’s own bodily pres-
ence. It is what he calls «artistic balance» and 
it is thanks to this experience that he can as-
sert the dignity and poetic beauty of his 
pathological experience: 
 
Glaringly conscious of my condition, I de-
scribe it with the perfect oxymoron of artis-
tic balance, in which to live is like following 
in vain the volatile breathing of the wind. 
You ask yourself why this wind accompa-
nies you inside your nest and why it hides 
when you open your eyes to share it with 
others. It is also a pleasure to let yourself be 
dazed by the aesthetic sense of life, by that 
aestheticism of smiles, tears, enthusiasm, like 
“suns” that will not come back anymore. 
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But in his actually lived time, he then tragi-
cally rediscovers (insofar as his moment of po-
etic beauty turns out to be a solipsistic illusion) 
how temporary, how transitory this fulfilment 
is, and how poor reality is replete with the fail-
ures he experiences and lacking the profundity 
that he reaches in imagination. These two types 
of lived time, then, are – paradoxically – not 
chronologically distinct, nor dialectically articu-
lated, but they are his one and only instantane-
ous lived time, both exalting on the imaginative 
level and frustrating on the reality level.  
So Arthur’s lived time is a paradoxical one, 
even more than his lived space. In his lived 
space, there is still the possibility of an inte-
raction, although in an imaginary dimension, 
with the subjects that scare him, which can be 
localized and therefore confined, in spite of 
their constant menace of invasion. In his lived 
space, some dimensions can become «old», 
the threatening person embodied in them can 
change if new experiences “substitute” the old 
ones in emotional importance, and, as we have 
seen, Arthur has some bodily strategies to con-
trol their influence. Nothing like that is possi-
ble on the temporal level: the presence of a 
«destroying» time is unavoidable (as Ovidio 
wrote, tempus edax rerum, time devours every-
thing) and imagination, in its structural “as 
if”,51 is constantly referred to its own flimsi-
ness, transience and inconsistency. The only 
way to distance oneself from this tremendous 
temporal experience, making it  acceptable, is 
to consider grief – somehow    poetically – as a 
possible, even though tragic, identity:  
 
The only way to bear grief is to transform 
it from an oppressive entity to a funda-
mental identity, and I see the deeply patho-
logical way in which I identify myself, a 
way in which grief becomes an unavoida-
ble constant of one’s own richness and of 
one’s own life.  
 
Arthur is well aware of the intolerability of 
his condition:  
 
I am not at all in reality, I am just an idea, 
just potential: my reality is absence, ridicu-
lousness (Dostoevskij). That’s why it bo-
thers me that real and ideal don’t speak to 
each other, that’s why I suffer an ideal re-
maining unsatisfied.  
 
His ability to live only in possibility («I’m 
not at all in reality, I’m only idea») while      
avoiding reality – as reality provokes affection 
anxiety and emotional instability – makes him 
desperate. The grief for the incommunicabil-
ity of the real and the ideal that «don’t speak 
to each other» strengthens his sense of impo-
tence, of eternal defeat, in every circumstance 
of life, which in turn leads him to abandon any 
purpose of self-realization and intersubjectivi-
ty: he feels unable to love, unable to offer a fu-
ture or even just a present to a person, thus 
deferring any possible love, friendship or even 
sexual relation to an indefinite, ideal future 
(«when I’ll be prepared, when I’ll be able to 
communicate, when I’ll have more compe-
tences»). 
In the last few years, Arthur has tried to 
follow a regular pharmacological therapy, but 
more than once he has interrupted it, frustrat-
ed by its negative side effects and its observed 
substantial inefficacy. His personal, vulnera-
ble, contradictory psychic homeostasis is cer-
tainly surprising, although it is constantly 
menaced by permanent suffering and an insu-
perable, sometimes unbearable sense of fail-
ure. Only once he confessed to me that he had 
considered suicide, and when I asked what 
prevented him from taking his life, he an-
swered: «I didn’t want to go away in silence. I 
still have something to say».  
So in his deepest desperation, the one rea-
son that keeps him alive is his desire to be 
there, to be present in the world through his 
words, the desire to give himself a form even if 
it is so difficult for him.  
 
█  Embodied and disembodied desire: A    
philosophical discussion 
 
It is now necessary to analyze the tran-
scendental conditions of embodied desire, to 
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point out what makes the difference in Ar-
thur’s disembodied desire. On the level of the 
self, the first, essential condition of embodied 
desire has to be found in what Husserl has 
called «drive intentionality» (Triebsintentio-
nalität), which is another name for «self-
affection»,52 intending that fundamental sen-
se of being alive as conscious vital drive.  
Referring particularly to Husserl’s Studien 
zur Struktur des Bewußtsein (the still un-
published Studies on the structure of conscious-
ness) and to his Analysen zur Passive Synthese, 
affection can be described as the effect of the 
sensory, bodily contact between subjectivity 
and its world, which takes place whenever the 
ego is led by passive tendencies (coming from 
the background of consciousness) to pay at-
tention (Zuwendung) to the world. Affection 
is thus the stimulus, the impulse moving the 
“functioning ego” (fungierende Ich, the pre-
reflexive ego), shifting its attention toward 
what it is missing:  
 
By affection we understand the stimulus 
given to consciousness, the peculiar pull 
that an object given to consciousness exer-
cises on the ego – it is a pull that is relaxed 
when the ego turns toward it attentively, 
and progresses from here, striving toward 
self-giving intuition, disclosing more and 
more of the self of the object.53  
 
As Deodati has recently shown,54 this      
explanation refers to the “superior” level of 
affection, i.e., the level of receptivity (both 
passive and active), where the subject turns 
the passively articulated material into a begin-
ning of activity (by turning its attention to-
wards the material itself). The “lower”, more 
basic level of affection is the genetic, passive 
level of original affection (Uraffektion) or self-
affection,55 the original «to be there, nearby» 
(Dabeisein), «to be directed to» (Daraufge-
richtetsein)»,56 through which an individual 
consciousness or subjectivity exposes itself to 
relation with the world in the temporalization 
(Zeitigung) of the continuously flowing present. 
Self-affection, or drive-intentionality, ac-
counts then for the transcendental origin of 
time- and space-consciousness: the original 
impression (Urimpression) affecting conscious-
ness in its living present and in its lived space 
generates subjectivity by presenting its impul-
ses and drives in context of a world. As far as 
space is concerned, impulse (Antrieb) is in-
deed crucial as bodily «disposition to the mo-
bilization of expansive directions»57 and drive 
(Trieb) is an «essential form of bodily direc-
tionality (Richtung)».58  
This means that thanks to impulse and 
drive, human conscious life is constituted in 
the awareness of a difference between inner 
(the bodily self as source of the sensation of 
something missing) and outer space (the 
source of possible fulfilment) and thus guides 
the lived body in the search for satisfaction 
towards its outer environment. As far as time 
is concerned, human conscious life is original-
ly affected not only by the outer world, but by 
bodily impulses and drives in its search for sat-
isfaction. The repetition of this differential 
movement enacted by drive-intentionality 
makes growth and development of a self pos-
sible, i.e., makes the ego-constitution possible: 
what Husserl calls the origin of lived time, i.e., 
drive-intentionality,59 co-originates lived spa-
ce in distinguishing an inner from an outer. 
The deep connection in the transcendental 
constitution of space and time consciousness 
is well underlined in this passage by Fuchs: 
 
Drive tension founds an original time dif-
ferential or a “time span” that appears as a 
bodily “being ahead-of-oneself” (leibliches 
Sich-Vorweg-Sein) in movement, too, as 
“holding a purpose” (Zielinnehabe). Lived 
time is characterized through the cyclic     
return of single drive impulses and their   
respective duration. Drives then constitute 
the inner-outer difference of the body just 
as the difference between already and not-
yet, the temporal anticipation.60 
 
Similar to the role impulses and drives play 
on the spatial level, where they have an orient-
ing function, on the temporal level by differ-
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entiating inner as an experience of lack from 
outer as the possibility of fulfilment, they con-
stitute an early differentiation in lived time as 
bodily direction towards a lacking, mostly still 
undefined “something”. The inner body is 
then experienced as “already” lacking, as al-
ready empty, after having been fulfilled, and 
as “not yet” satisfied: in the bodily present of 
drive intentionality, inner time-consciousness 
structures its articulation in impressions (acts 
of awareness of what is perceived “right now”), 
retentions (acts of immediate memory of what 
has been perceived “just a moment ago”) and 
protentions (immediate anticipations of what 
will be perceived “in a moment”).  
For Husserl, inner time-consciousness is 
structured twice: on the one hand, impres-
sionally, i.e., immediately receptive of the in-
tertwined flow made up by retentions, impres-
sions and protentions, and on the other hand 
reproductively, i.e., mediately producing mod-
ifications of past or possible presentations,    
respectively in memory and imagination. 
In Arthur’s case his bodily directionality is 
continuously interrupted by his tics and con-
tracted by his anxiety, thus to have a natural 
volitional disposition and a natural bodily ori-
entation towards his environment seems al-
most impossible for him. His affection-anxiety 
permeates both his bodily lived space and the 
constant stream of his «living present» (leben-
dige Gegenwart). According to my observations, 
the impressional quality of time experienced as 
flimsy, transitory, immediate and not lasting 
also permeates reproductive consciousness, 
thus giving a confusing quality to recollections 
(Wiedererinnerungen) and to imaginings (Phan-
tasie), exalting their transience.  
His environment can never be experienced 
as the source of possible satisfaction and his 
memory fails in constituting both practical   
abilities, so called “know-how”, and structured 
theoretical knowledge. His desire has thus  
never reached an embodied character: surviv-
ing in imagination, even if increasingly de-
tached from any tendency to realization, his 
disembodied desire has been his only chance 
to maintain at least an illusory relation with 
the world.  
Arthur’s desire is moreover exalted by his 
prolonged disembodied presence. If embodied 
desire can be annihilated by repeated frustra-
tion, by an unachievable object, disembodied 
desire is not only detached from its objects 
and actual realizations, but rather grows and    
flourishes in and thanks to absence, flimsiness, 
nothing. It is guided by a closed-circuit teleol-
ogy, at risk of acquiring autistic traits. On the 
one hand, Arthur’s disembodied desire is     
enhanced by his condition. On the other hand, 
it exposes him to the risk of depletion of vital 
energy, because no embodied satisfaction that 
would give new impulse to drives, desires and 
projects is ever experienced. After years of   
disembodied desire, even imagination be-
comes unable to invent new virtual satisfac-
tions: it remains obscured and is eventually 
defeated by repeated failures. 
Embodied desire has indeed a dialectical  
relation with the natural and social environ-
ment of a desiring subject: it can change ob-
ject or modify its aims when the situation 
shows the impossibility of any realization. 
Similarly when different desires are conflict-
ing, or when a first-order desire is contrasted 
by a second-order desire:61 embodied desire 
ensues from mediations and transformations 
allowing it to overcome internal and external 
limits, in order to gain the best satisfaction 
possible.  
Disembodied desire, on the contrary, aims 
neither at realization nor at conflict resolu-
tion. Disembodied desire is not nourished by a    
dialectical relation with reality, but rather by 
its failed fulfilment. It is no longer a relation 
with an object (that is, psychodynamically in-
tended, either an object or a person) and, 
through the object, with one’s own self (the 
object playing the role of form that limits and 
at the same time determines the self); it is an 
immediate relation with one’s own self in its 
vagueness, mutability, elusiveness and incom-
pleteness: it is depleted, empty longing. Dis-
embodied desire can only be paradoxical in its 
structure: it looks for satisfaction where it 
cannot be found, namely in the self, which is 
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never disposable (“zuhanden”). It is thus never 
extinguished, but at best nourished. This free 
spinning in its closed-circuit therefore tends to 
reach a paroxysm where only emptiness and 
failure remain, occupying all temporal forms, 
past, present and future.  
So the structural analysis of disembodied 
desire in Arthur’s individual case suggests a 
formulation for a basic phenomenological  
theory of embodied desire, which can be  
summarized as follows. Drive-intentionality is 
conceived, with Husserl’s concept, as the ori-
ginal tendency of consciousness to be nearby 
itself, directed towards something affecting 
consciousness itself. Impulses and drives 
structurally affect bodily consciousness: 
«drive intentionality» is their transcendental 
aspect, their common structure. A healthy, 
well embodied ego-constitution, made up of 
the two levels of self-constitution and of inter-
subjectivity, is indeed originally possible thanks 
to drive intentionality.  
On the level of self-constitution, drive in-
tentionality essentially structures space and 
time consciousness through the differentia-
tion of inner from outer space and of already 
from not-yet. On the level of intersubjectivity, 
drive intentionality generates the need for re-
lationships with others and consequently, on a 
higher level, the need for harmonization be-
tween one’s own and others’ desires: the other 
subject is indeed perceived, and interacted 
with, as a desire-holder and to avoid conflicts, 
and to achieve some social stability, harmoni-
zation between different possibilities and aims 
is needed. 
Imagination, on the other hand, provides 
us with the possibility of a «distanced self-
representation of drive»,62 making the pas-
sage from drive to desire possible and confer-
ring to desire a very personal form, while re-
processing previous experiences and inherited 
socio-cultural practices and values. It is imagi-
nation that continuously opens new possibili-
ties for human desire and, through desire, to 
human life, freeing the human body from the 
immediacy of drive. It is then the dialectical 
relation with the natural, social and historical 
environment to further modify desire: it is 
embodied through perception-in-action. 
As desire can be considered the essential 
bond between the self and its environment, it 
represents an essential bond with life even for 
a disordered, in this case, disembodied self:     
Arthur’s experience shows that it represents 
the core essential possibility of being in the 
world with the dignity, the creativity and the 
vulnerability of a human being.  
 
█  Conclusions 
 
Having raised the possibility of philosoph-
ical practice as a rehabilitation activity for pa-
tients in psychiatric services, this study has 
presented the phenomenological analysis of a 
case of schizotypal personality disorder from 
the perspective of Blankenburg’s loss of natu-
ral self-evidence and its contemporary deve-
lopment, i.e., psychopathology of common 
sense conceiving schizophrenia as a syndrome 
rooted in ipseity disturbance and in disem-
bodiment of the self.  
I hereby underlined analogies and dif-
ferences with Blankenburg’s patient Anne: the 
difficulties in the ego-constitution, due to a 
pre-reflexive disruption in self-awareness, are 
similar and can be summarized by distinguish-
ing the two levels of (a) the self, which is fail-
ing in its constitution, and (b) intersubjectivi-
ty, which fails as equal reciprocity.  
The most important difference between the 
two cases is however Arthur’s ability to build a 
secondary anchorage to the life-world through 
imagination. The analysis of Arthur’s spatial 
disorder elucidated more closely the bodily as-
pects of his desire: his vital impulses and drives 
(hunger, sexual drives, intentional movements 
in space) seem interrupted or blocked by what I 
have defined as affection anxiety, i.e., the anxie-
ty of an undefined, inner, but alien need for re-
lationship with the life-world.  
Drives and impulses are consequently ex-
perienced as own and alien at the same time,    
losing their natural tendency towards satisfac-
tion, so that desire remains closed in the 
closed circuit of fantasy, emphasizing Arthur’s 
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active departure from reality. Imagination 
thus assumes a compensatory function by re-
placing the avoided others in his lived space, 
but without getting rid of a pervasive ambiva-
lence. On the temporal level, imaginatively 
and really lived time are paradoxically united 
in his one and only instantaneous lived time, 
both exalting on the imaginative level and 
frustrating on the reality level. Just as lived 
time is reduced to an at the same time perfect 
and flimsy, satisfying and unsatisfying instant, 
disembodied desire shows its paradoxical 
structure: it can find satisfaction only where it 
is impossible to be realized, that is in imagina-
tion and, in the end, in an isolated self.  
The philosophical elucidation of the prob-
lem of disembodied desire requires a basic 
phenomenological theory of desire, dealing 
both with drive intentionality, as the tran-
scendental condition of the ego-constitution, 
and with imagination, as the distanced self-
representation of drive and as a structural 
possibility of distancing the immediacy of 
bodily experience.  
Such a phenomenology of desire is ob-
viously in need of further interdisciplinary    
examination: (1) from a philosophical point of 
view, the theory needs to be better grounded 
not only in Husserl’s phenomenology, but also 
in the phenomenological tradition of the 
twentieth-century, in order to expand the cen-
trality of desire in embodied cognitive scienc-
es (as transcendentally and also existentially 
conceived); (2) from a psychopathological 
point of view, the implications of such a theo-
ry should be further investigated, on the one 
hand, to distinguish disembodied from em-
bodied desire and, on the other hand, in rela-
tion to the structure of schizotypal personality 
disorder and other pathologies at least those 
within the schizophrenic spectrum: is disem-
bodied desire observable in other patients 
who have received the same diagnosis as Ar-
thur and/or with other diagnoses in the same 
cluster? Is this a relevant concept for their 
psychopathological description?; (3) From a 
clinical point of view, it can be asked if disem-
bodied desire represents not only a vulnerabil-
ity, but also an essential bond with life even 
for a disordered, disembodied self such as Ar-
thur’s. If so, it would represent a pivotal point 
for every psychotherapy with such patients. 
For this reason, further interdisciplinary re-
search on the topic appears promising. 
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